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Abstract: This article appraises the EU’s approach to preventing further in security in the West-
ern Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The purpose of this endeavour is to determine whether EU 
efforts meet needs on the ground as well as in Brussels. The article identifies similar sources 
albeit different degrees of instability across the two regions. It reviews EU strategies and CSDP 
missions deployed in response and evaluates the effectiveness of two such missions: EULEX 
Kosovo and EUCAP Nestor/Somalia. The study does not find failures as such in the strategies 
developed or missions deployed, but it does conclude that while relatively effective from an EU 
perspective this approach is less effective in providing security on the ground. 
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) has long pursued peace through prevention. Regional coopera-
tion and capacity building are believed to have brought peace to Europe and has there-
fore been promoted beyond its borders. Over the past 15 years, the EU has supported 
this security strategy through the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) missions.1But does it work? This enquiry focuses on the EU’s practical support 
for security provision on the ground through CSDP missions. Specifically, it appraises 
the implementation of European security strategy in the Western Balkans and the Horn 
of Africa, two regions that the Union itself has singled out as priority areas in which to 
prevent further instability. 
The article is structured into five sections. The first introduces the research design. The 
second analyses two regional security complexes in which the EU has engaged. The third 
reviews EU strategies and CSDP missions deployed in these regions, examining the 
Union’s activities so far as well as its ambitions for the future. The fourth section selects 
and studies two specific initiatives: the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in 
Kosovo and the Regional European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission 
(EUCAP) in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean, later renamed EUCAP Soma-
lia. The fifth section discusses whether the EU has effectively built local capacity that pre-
vents further insecurity in these two countries and regions. Finally, the article synthesises 
five key lessons for the future. 
Research Design
The empirical focus of this research is on the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. This 
reflects the EU’s priority to prevent further insecurity on its borders to the East and South.2 
The study begins by conducting a comparative analysis of these two regional security com-
plexes. The level of analysis is regional with a focus on challenges and priorities for security 
provision shared across both areas. This is not to undermine differences between or indeed 
within these regions, but rather to explore whether and if so what can be done at and across 
the regional level– and whether the EU is effective in this regard. This is important as the EU 
assumes regional strategies towards security provision in both areas.
To explore the effectiveness of this approach on the ground, the analysis moves from 
the regional level to the national and then local level. To this end, the study compares 
specific CSDP missions from each region. In the development of capabilities for security 
provision, two missions – EULEX Kosovo and EUCAP Nestor/Somalia – are particularly 
relevant, as these are key CSDP deployments in each region. The two are similar in their 
typology as civilian CSDP missions, but differ in their mandates as well as the contexts 
1 Council of the European Union 2003.
2 Ibid.
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within which they have deployed. The analytical approach applied is a comparative case 
study. It explores operational effectiveness by integrating perspectives from the interven-
er and those intervened upon. It goes on to consider what was achieved – or not – as well 
as the way in which this was sought achieved. The two missions are thus appraised using 
a two-pronged approach to evaluating effectiveness, reviewing first internal perspectives 
from within the EU and then external perspectives on the ground, appraising both goals 
attained and the appropriateness of means applied. Building on existing methodology for 
evaluating effectiveness in CSDP missions3, the comparative case study is structured and 
focused around four research questions. First, did the mission achieve the EU’s strategic 
goals and operational objectives? Second, was the mandate implemented in a timely, effi-
cient and cost-effective manner? Third, has the mission contributed to preventing further 
insecurity? Fourth and finally, did the mission apply proportional measures of prevention?
Data collection and analysis was informed by a state-of-the-art literature review to ensure 
that this research builds upon and makes a genuine contribution to existing knowledge 
and practice. Desk studies of official strategies, documents and reports were undertaken. 
Primary data was collected through fieldwork in the Horn of Africa and the Western 
Balkans. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with current and former 
staff from EU agencies, missions and member states as well as with representatives from 
governmental and non-governmental organisations representing various views on the 
ground. Additionally, the Horn of Africa study was informed by interviews facilitated by 
the Somalia-based partners to this project conducted in collaboration with other schol-
ars. The work of external researchers is referenced accordingly.
Comparing Regional Security Complexes in the Western Balkans  
and the Horn of Africa
At first glance, the two regions examined have significant dissimilarities; the Horn of 
Africa is characterised by on-going conflict and insecurity, while the Western Balkans 
constitute a post-conflict stabilisation scenario. However, both are regional security com-
plexes. That is, geographic areas where the security of one actor interacts with that of 
others.4 In both regions, such security interdependence is intense and must be appreci-
ated and appropriately addressed to prevent further insecurity. Throughout both regions 
authoritarian regimes and power politics undermine governance. Governments across 
these areas stand accused of suppressing minority groups and views. This creates chal-
lenges both within and between countries, as political elites fuel inter-group grievances to 
gain and retain power. Both the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa face problems of 
democratic deficit, unequal economic development and limitations to civic, human and 
3 Rodt 2017 develops effectiveness criteria for civilian CSDP missions with a preventive purpose 
and indicators by which to evaluate them. That analytical framework has been adjusted and 
applied for the purpose of this research through the development and application of the four 
research questions articulated above.
4 Buzan and Wæver 2003.
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minority rights. Thus, it is important in both cases to sustain external support for state 
and institution building, particularly with regard to the provision of security and the rule 
of law.5
Ruling elites in both regions prove unable and unwilling to represent their populations as 
a whole, alienating rather than standing accountable to their citizenry. As a result, states 
struggle to secure and control their full territories and ensure that institutions reach and 
represent all people. Gaps between governments and parts of their populations contrib-
ute to continued disputes over legitimate rule and regulation. The state itself has become 
a bone of contention, as politics have become a zero-sum game. This has repeatedly led to 
violence, as different groups have fought for rights, recognition and representation. In the 
slipstream hereof, organised crime challenges countries in both regions, whether this ma-
terialises in illicit trade of people, goods and services or other criminal enterprises such 
as piracy, terrorism or recruitment of foreign fighters. These problems are connected and 
exacerbated at the regional level as insecure borders allow criminal networks and activi-
ties to operate across national and international boundaries. National security problems 
must therefore be solved with regard to the broader region, just as regional approaches 
must deliver on the ground.6
In sum, the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa experience similar causes and con-
sequences of conflict, although they differ significantly in the degree to which these chal-
lenge local, national and regional security – let alone European stability. The findings of 
this first part of the analysis illustrate the importance of international actors like the EU 
neither undermining regional security in favour of national security nor vice versa, but 
working actively to promote security at all levels, simultaneously addressing causes and 
consequences of conflicts to prevent further violence both within and between countries. 
Therefore, the following looks first at regional and then national level EU responses in 
order to determine whether they serve needs on the ground. 
EU Regional Strategies for Security Provision in the Western Balkans and  
the Horn of Africa
The EU has framed its approach to preventing further violent conflict in the Western 
Balkans as a regional Stabilisation and Association Process. This has allowed the EU to 
promote, support and reward conflict prevention in the region, whilst addressing its own 
concerns regarding security and serious crimes on and across its borders in South Eastern 
Europe. The kingpin of this process is the promise of further European integration for the 
countries in the region, which has motivated progress through a combination of push and 
pull factors. Integrating conflict prevention into the wider European integration process 
in these countries has made much progress. However, security challenges remain and 
the EU’s regional strategy of stabilisation through association requires that the member-
5 Rodt et al. 2017.
6 Ibid.
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ship prospect remains credible, as demonstrated by the way in which enlargement fatigue 
within the Union translates into reform reluctance outside it.7
The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa similarly takes a regional approach 
towards providing security and preventing conflict in that region. Within this Frame-
work the EU has integrated its policies promoting security and development, seeking to 
strengthen institutions, governance and the rule of law to counter challenges like piracy 
and terrorism, both by seeking to eradicate specific groups and reducing structural causes 
of insecurity such as government instability, socioeconomic inequality and unemploy-
ment. The EU seeks to increase cooperation with as well as between and within these 
countries and to strengthen regional governments, organisations and solutions. At pres-
ent, however, Horn governments with limited reach and enforcement capabilities such 
as the Federal Government of Somalia can handle neither terrorism nor piracy without 
assistance, nor do they have the ability to prosecute and reintegrate apprehended crimi-
nals or prevent further violence and conflict. This illustrates a gap between EU strategic 
ambitions and realities on the ground, similar to that in the Western Balkans.8
In response to some of the specific challenges identified above, the EU has sought to 
support its strategic approaches towards both regions through a series of CSDP deploy-
ments. These have focused in particular on strengthening security structures through po-
lice, military and rule of law missions. Regional reviews of these efforts are synthesised in 
Table 1 and 2. 
7 Rodt et al. 2017.
8 Ibid.
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(i) Strengthening the operational capacity and 
joint capability of the agencies engaged in the 
fights against organised crime and corruption, 
(ii) assisting and supporting in the planning and 
conduct of investigations in the fight against 
organised crime and corruption in a systematic 
approach, (iii) assisting and promoting develop-
ment of criminal investigative capacities of BiH, 
(iv) enhancing police-prosecution cooperation, 
(v) strengthening police-penitentiary system 
cooperation and (vi) contributing to ensuring a 




strength in January 
2003: 478 interna-
tional staff and 296 
national staff
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2003 Supporting FYROM in its implementation of 
the Ohrid Agreement, ending the hostilities 






375 personnel in 
March 200310
EU Police Mis-





Support (i) consolidation of law and order, 
including the fight against organised crime, (ii) 
practical implementation of the comprehen-
sive reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
including the police, (iii) operational transition 
and creation of a border police, (iv) local police 
in building confidence within population and 
(v) enhanced co-operation with neighbouring 
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December 200311
EU Police As-
sistance Team – 
EUPAT FYROM
2006 Succeeded EUPOL Proxima in monitoring and 
mentoring mid- and senior level police officers. 
Focus on border police, public peace, order, 












(i) To provide support via Collective and Com-
bined Training in order to support the ability 
of the BiH Armed Forces to sustain interna-
tional standards,13(ii) to support BiH efforts to 
maintain the safe and secure environment in 
BiH and (iii) to provide support to the overall 
EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
600 personnel in 
January 201514





To assist and support the Kosovo authorities in 
the rule of law area, specifically in the police, 
judiciary and customs areas.
Kosovo Authorised maxi-




10 Ladzik 2009, 2.
11 EUPOL Proxima 2003.
12 EU Council Secretariat 2005.
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Table 1: Regional review of CSDP missions deployed in the Western Balkans16
Mission/operation Deployment Mandate Country Capacity
EU Naval Force – 
NAVFOR Operation 
Atalanta
2008–ongoing (i) Protect vessels from World Food 
Programme, African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) and other 
vulnerable shipping, (ii) deter and 
disrupt piracy, (iii) monitor fishing 
activities and (iv) support other 
EU missions and activities of other 
international organisations in the 
region.
Coast of Somalia Changes during 
the year but 1000 
personnel overall17
EU Training Mission 
– EUTM Somalia
2010–ongoing Initially training Somali forces. Later 
mandate was refocused to training 
of personnel at the political and 
military strategic level within Somali 
defence institutions.
First Uganda, then 
Somalia from 2014




Building Mission in 
the Horn of Africa 




2012–ongoing To establish and capacity build 
maritime civilian law enforcement 
capability in HoA and Western 
Indian Ocean (later only in Somalia) 
by assisting authorities in carrying 
out coast guard functions and 





2015 the focus 
has been solely on 
Somalia
81 international 
staff and 18 
national in May 
201919
Table 2: Regional review of CSDP missions deployed in the Horn of Africa20
16 Rodt et al. 2017, 97−98 (revised).
17 Two surface combat vessels and 2 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts in May 2019. 
EUNAVFOR Somalia no date.
18 EEAS 2017a.
19 EEAS 2017b.
20 Rodt et al. 2017, 95 (revised).
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Comparative Case Study of EULEX Kosovo and EUCAP Nestor/Somalia
This next part of the analysis examines whether, and if so how, two specific CSDP mis-
sions have helped the EU achieve what it set out to do in its regional strategies to prevent 
further insecurity in the Western Balkans and Horn of Africa. In so doing, it performs a 
structured, focused comparison of EULEX Kosovo and EUCAP Nestor/Somalia. Kosovo 
and Somalia constitute particularly pressing and complex challenges in their respective 
regions and are illustrative examples of how local, national, regional and international lev-
els of security are interdependent. The CSDP missions are the Union’s practical response 
to those challenges. Moreover, they have been selected, as they are recent, ongoing and 
extensive missions; cases where the EU has practically sought to implement strategies, fo-
cus activities and apply resources to prevent further insecurity in each of the two regions. 
They are representative cases of civilian CSDP missions deployed to build local capacity 
to prevent further insecurity. At the same time, each in their own way, they are unique and 
a first of their kind, representing a continued EU ambition to respond to local realities. As 
such, they are and can be expected to have had a significant impact on the ground. 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, known as EULEX, was launched 
in February 2008. Ten years on it remains the largest civilian CSDP mission to date and 
the only one with an executive mandate to directly implement rule of law.21 Its aim is to 
aid and assist Kosovo authorities to implement rule of law specifically with regard to the 
police, judiciary and customs, preferably through monitoring, mentoring and advising 
(MMA), but retaining – where this is deemed appropriate – executive responsibility and 
authority.22 The current mandate covers the period until 14 June 2020.23 The European 
Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and Western 
Indian Ocean was launched in July 2012 as the first civilian maritime mission operating 
across a number of countries in a region. Activities in Djibouti, Seychelles and Tanzania 
have since been phased out and Headquarters relocated to Somalia in 2015. When the 
mandate was renewed in December 2016, the mission renamed EUCAP Somalia re-fo-
cused on strengthening that country’s maritime security capacity.24 In 2018, this mandate 
was extended until December 2020.25
21 Council of the European Union 2008.
22 van der Borgh 2016.
23 EULEX 2019.
24 Council of the European Union 2012; EUCAP Somalia 2017.
25 Council of the European Union 2018.
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Operational Effectiveness from an EU Perspective
The comparative case study of the two CSDP missions is structured and focused by four 
research questions. It begins by applying an EU perspective and asking (a) whether each 
mission achieved the Union’s strategic goals and operational objectives (b) in a timely, ef-
ficient and cost-effective manner.
Has EULEX Kosovo achieved the EU’s strategic goals and operational objectives?
EULEX was launched with a mandate to: “Assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authori-
ties and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and account-
ability and in further developing and strengthening an independent and multi-ethnic jus-
tice system and a multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions 
are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards 
and European best practices”. EULEX was tasked to support capacity building in Kosovo’s 
judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies through monitoring, mentoring and 
advising, while at the same time, it was the first CSDP mission with executive powers to 
investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and enforce law.26
From an EU perspective, this mission was ambitious. Its strategic goals were high and 
its operational objectives were difficult to obtain. The mandate was criticised by a Euro-
pean Court of Auditors (ECA) review, which deemed it too broad, especially as it was not 
broken down into clear benchmarks and verifiable indicators.27 According to the ECA, 
this left operational objectives unclear and made achieving, monitoring and evaluating 
progress difficult. EULEX’s mandate to implement internationally recognised standards 
and European best practices created further confusion as not all EU member states had 
reached the same standards or shared practices.28 A later review suggested that the EU 
would have to dedicate itself to this process for decades to come, if Kosovo was to reach 
the highest international levels or European best practices of jurisprudence.29 A third 
challenge presented by the mandate was its lack of clarity concerning when the mission’s 
executive power would take over from its supporting functions – and vice versa – leaving 
26 This could be done by international investigators, prosecutors and judges in cooperation with 
their Kosovo counterparts or independently and might include arrests of suspects or riot polic-
ing without prior consultation with Kosovo Police (KP), if it was considered to have failed to 
provide effective first response. EULEX’s executive mandate included the power to reverse or 
annul operational decisions taken by Kosovo authorities, if this was deemed necessary for the 
maintenance and promotion of rule of law, public order and security. The executive mandate 
specifically concerned war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, 
financial and economic crimes and other so-called serious crimes (Council of the EU 2008).
27 ECA 2012, 26. 
28 Interview 1.
29 Jacqué 2015, 16.
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it unclear when host authorities were deemed ready to perform their duties only with sup-
port from EULEX and when they were not.30
Despite the difficulties identified in the mandate, both former and current EULEX em-
ployees argued that the mission’s broad competencies were appropriate. Key persons ac-
cused of war crimes, in their experience, were often simultaneously involved in organ-
ised crime and corruption, wherefore evidence could not be collected properly without 
examining the linkages between them.31 Some stressed that the executive mandate was 
especially important in investigating and prosecuting war crimes, as internationals were 
deemed less likely to be partial or corrupt in an area, where vast vested interests were at 
stake and may obstruct justice.32 While this is not necessarily the case, in order for a rule 
of law mission to be implemented successfully, primary data suggests that it was rightfully 
designed to include all elements of investigation, prosecution and adjudication, although 
these should have been better integrated from the beginning. 
The EULEX mission itself lists as its key achievements: first, the strengthening effort to 
train Kosovo police; second, advice and material support for the establishment and man-
agement of border crossings points; third, support and advice to the Kosovo Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council; and fourth, legislative assistance and support to other structural 
reforms. This indicates some success towards achieving its mandated goals to assist Koso-
vo’s judiciary, police and customs. Independent mid-mission reviews similarly conclude 
30 EULEX personnel explained how initially international investigation, prosecution and adju-
dication were separate from domestic parallel processes, thus, preventing EULEX staff from 
coaching host country law enforcement and judicial professionals during their execution of 
these tasks. While this was explained by a fear of corruption and information leaks, it should 
not, they argued, have prevented better coordination between the Executive and Strengthen-
ing Divisions of the mission to promote shared models of governance for Kosovo’s law en-
forcement and judicial institutions. This might in turn have allowed for a smoother transition 
between executive and capacity-building functions. EULEX staff recommended that future 
missions link executive and capacity-building functions in one combined effort from the be-
ginning. Interviews 2, 3 and 4. A EULEX staff member indicated that the ECA criticism was 
perceived internally as a recommendation to transfer competencies from the Executive to the 
Strengthening Division and to lower staff numbers, so as to imply success in certain mission 
areas. The interviewee suggested, however, that this was unrealistic, because of the resources 
required to complete the tasks leftover. The example given was the cut of an integrated bor-
der management (IBM) component from the Executive Section during a 2016 revision of the 
mandate. This decision by member states left the task of monitoring border posts in Northern 
Kosovo to the Strengthening Division. With only one expert for IBM and four advisors in the 
North, they struggled to meet local demands, e.g. attending joint weekly meetings of Kosovo 
and Serbian police, who would not meet without EULEX. “There are three meetings a week in 
15 border crossings, so how can freedom of movement be implemented, if EULEX does not 
support [Kosovo and Serbian border police services] talking?” Interview 2. 
31 Interview 2 and 4.
32 Interview 3 and 4.
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that EULEX has fulfilled parts of its mandate, but tend to see the glass as half-empty 
rather than half-full.33
Subsequent to external criticism regarding the lack of mission monitoring and evalua-
tion, EULEX introduced a new ‘programmatic approach’ for the first time in any CSDP 
mission, tasking the Strengthening Division to monitor the progress of host institutions 
against strategic objectives agreed by EU member states.34 The most effective capacity-
building effort proved the development of the customs service, due in part to the con-
sistency of international assistance, which was led and supervised by only one European 
actor – the UK – for almost two decades, deploying key personnel in the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and EULEX.35 This illustrates how the effectiveness of one 
actor is always connected to that of others and must be evaluated as such. 
Following the mid-mission reviews, EULEX also started measuring the performance of 
its executive functions by the number of new indictments made and actions completed. 
By 2016,EULEX listed the following indicators of progress: delivery of approximately 620 
verdicts; completed investigations of 250 war crime cases and involvement in the pro-
ceedings of ca. 1,350 other cases; adjudication in over 42,700 property related cases and 
excavation of alleged mass graves.36 Published judgments in serious and complex cases are 
considered a particularly important EULEX legacy for the Kosovo judiciary to follow in 
future adjudications.37 However, due to a high turnover of staff, there has been a backlog 
of cases, many of which were transferred to national authorities after the 2014 mandate 
33 “Assistance has made only a modest contribution to building the capacity of the Kosovo police 
and little progress has been made in the fight against organised crime. In the judicial sector 
assistance has been useful but the judiciary continues to suffer from political interference, inef-
ficiency and a lack of transparency and enforcement. EU interventions have had only limited 
results in tackling corruption, which continues to prevail in many areas. Most progress was 
made in the area of customs. There has been almost no progress in establishing the rule of law 
in the North of Kosovo. Overall, the sustainability of results which have been achieved by the 
assistance is threatened by a lack of political will, weak financial capacity and the limited influ-
ence of civil society.” ECA 2012, 35. Three years on, another review pointed to a lack of progress 
in the fight against corruption and organised crime, highlighting continued corruption in the 
judiciary and a culture of political interference in law enforcement and judicial processes as 
especially challenging tasks ahead. Jacqué 2015,17. Local experts have expressed similar con-
cerns. Kursani 2013.
34 As explained by EULEX (no date): “The central aim is to ensure accountability and to statis-
tically measure the achievements of EULEX, by measuring the progress of the local rule of 
law institutions”. These activities were frequently overlapping with the European Commission’s 
pre-accession assistance for institution building, as well as a number of other international 
activities in the field. The effectiveness of capacity-building is linked to several international ac-
tors supporting local institutions and the consistency of approaches and coordination of efforts 
that they have developed in collaboration with local counterparts.
35 Welski 2014.
36 quoted in Zupančič et al. 2016, 28.
37 Interview 2.
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revision.38 Despite the importance of EULEX staff investigating some of the most difficult 
war crimes cases, the mission has had a mixed record also in this regard, as it has not 
completed many major cases concerning crimes allegedly committed in the immediate 
aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. These deficiencies reflect problems in mission planning 
and deployment, as well as the environment in which the mission operates.39
Most interlocutors interviewed for this study suggested that the Kosovo Police had more 
capacity due to the longer-term investment by the international community.40 In contrast, 
Kosovo’s judicial system is still an amalgamation of international judges (initially from 
UNMIK, later EULEX); judges recruited from the former Yugoslav judiciary; and newly 
enrolled ones.41 The discussion of challenges encountered when using international po-
lice and judges to develop capacities of local institutions is important for future missions. 
National policing styles are considered less diverse than national judicial practices.42 In 
effect, all interviewees agreed that the judiciary is the most difficult area of institutional 
capacity to develop for both the host country and the countries deploying capacity-build-
ing assistance, due to the difficulty of recruiting experienced staff and the absence of an 
agreed-upon EU model in this area. Therefore, in comparison to their capacity building 
efforts with the police, internationals have created more confusion in the judiciary, where 
core legislation was developed in line with continental European or Anglo-Saxon case law 
depending on which actor had more influence at a given moment.43 Diversity in different 
national judicial cultures also had an effect in the executive part of the EULEX mission, as 
38 The 2012 ECA stressed that such a mission should have sufficient and sustained human and 
material resources at its disposal from the beginning to ensure uninterrupted functioning. EU-
LEX staff members similarly suggest that if such an ambitious mission were to be implemented 
again, member states should guarantee a longer commitment, i.e. mandate, to the mission. 
They estimate that at least a decade is required to get a final verdict in complex cases regarding 
organised crime and war crimes. “It takes a few years to investigate a complex crime in a foreign 
country and to collect enough evidence for the trial. Then the first instance trial usually takes 
another two to three years, followed by a few years for 2nd instance trial and if there is re-trial 
it can take ten to fifteen years to get final decisions in complex cases”. Interview 2. The EULEX 
mission has now completed its tenth year in action. However, the extension of its mandate was 
not guaranteed from the beginning, but required approval by the Council and host government 
every two years. This lack of predictability in the duration of the mandate led to staff disengage-
ment. “Everybody is looking for a new job a year before expiry of the mandate, so that is usually 
the year when we have biggest turn-over of staff”. Interview 2. Due to expectations that the cur-
rent extension may be the last one and that EULEX may leave Kosovo, there is an impression that 
“major cases are pending as they [Kosovo institutions] are waiting for us to go”. Gjyshinica, 2016.
39 Capussela 2015; ECA 2012, 62−66. Interview 3, among others, listed challenges such as witness 
protection in a closely intertwined society such as Kosovo and political obstructions by local 
political elites and suggested that systems put in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina were more 
effective in protecting witnesses and providing support to victims.
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different judicial practices were exercised in the absence of a common understanding of 
‘highest European standards’.44
So, did EULEX Kosovo achieve the EU’s strategic goals and operational objectives? In part, 
the mission has had some success in achieving its overall aims, and although operational 
objectives were unclear in the beginning EULEX prides itself on specific achievements. 
Nevertheless, the Union has struggled to achieve all that it set out to do to support the 
provision of security through rule of law in Kosovo. The next question, therefore, is: why?
Has EULEX Kosovo’s implementation been timely, efficient and cost-effective? 
EULEX was slow to deploy. This was primarily caused by political differences among EU 
member states regarding the legal status of Kosovo and in effect EULEX.45 A second factor 
that limited the timeliness of EULEX implementation in Kosovo relates to inadequacies in 
member states’ capability for rapid and flexible deployment of competent civilian – espe-
cially judicial – staff. A third factor negatively impacting the timely implementation of this 
mission was the inadequate programming and procurement system of the European Com-
mission, which did not allow for timely procurement responding to operational needs.46
With regard to the efficiency of the mission, there have been two major sets of challenges. 
The first was related to human resources.47 Major staffing challenges and significant staff 
turnover led to a lack of consistency within the mission and in its relations with other 
actors.48 From the beginning, EULEX struggled to recruit the right number of staff with 
the relevant expertise. A EULEX employee highlighted how it is difficult to recruit the 
44 For example, in some EU countries informal meetings between judges and prosecutors are 
standard practice, while in others this is seen as interference in due process. Jacqué 2015, 17.
45 An EU Planning Team (EUPT) was deployed to Kosovo in 2006. It was replaced by EULEX two 
years later, twice the average time for mission deployment. The key reason for this delay being 
the wrongful assumption that the Ahtisaari plan for the future legal status of Kosovo would be 
adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC), enabling the EU to take over all competencies 
from the UN Mission in Kosovo. However, once the Ahtisaari plan was blocked by Russia in 
the UNSC and Kosovo subsequently declared its independence unilaterally, EU member states 
disagreed on the desired end-state towards which they wanted Kosovo and its institutions to 
develop. A compromise was found by allowing EULEX to deploy in line with UNSC Resolution 
1244 and function in parallel rather than as the successor to UNMIK. Having a separate plan-
ning mission preparing a complex mission like EULEX is good practice, however, future plan-
ning missions should be realistic and where necessary develop different operational options for 
various possible political scenarios. Grilj and Zupančič 2016, 68−71.
46 Procurement rules are slow, cumbersome and not adequate for this type of mission. In the 
words of one former EULEX employee, the procurement system “did not understand that court 
cases could not fit in the box.” Interview 3; ECA 2012, 28.
47 ECA 2012; Jacqué 2015, 18−19, Interview 3, who has worked in several CSDP missions noted 
that: “the biggest problems of CSDP and EEAS is recruitment, retention and firing (…) lack of 
a functioning human resources management system”.
48 ECA 2012.
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right profile of staff with sensitivity for transitional justice issues and experience of dealing 
with all phases of investigation, prosecution and adjudication of serious and ‘high politics’ 
crimes such as war crimes and organised crime.49 A further problem related to human 
resources is short secondments, as most member states do not support individual deploy-
ments longer than three and a half years. In fact, many secondments are only one year, 
which typically motivates junior rather than senior staff to apply.50 These problems were 
exacerbated by the requirement for all staff to go through another selection process after 
the 2010 mission review.51A second cause of EULEX inefficiency was related to coherence 
of action with other EU actors present in Kosovo – primarily the EU office and its political 
and developmental sections.
The lack of coherence among EU institutions, actors and tools limited not only the ef-
ficiency but also the cost-effectiveness of EULEX. There were major coordination chal-
lenges between the EU Office and EULEX, as they were both supporting rule of law in 
Kosovo – EULEX through its executive and MMA functions since 2010, and the EU Of-
fice from 2000 (and later through IPA). This overlap was partially caused by inadequate 
mission planning, as the EULEX planning document did not contain an exit strategy, 
objective benchmarks to measure progress or a plan for handing over responsibility for 
capacity-building to the EU Office or any other international actor.52 Related to this was 
the lack of a joint capacity-building concept among EU actors present in the field. The 
coherence of EU assistance was undermined by the absence of consensus between EU 
member states regarding Kosovo’s independence and the types of mandates that should 
be held by Kosovo’s institutions. By filling EU posts predominantly through secondments, 
it was frequently left to national experts involved in capacity-building efforts to choose 
models to be promoted in the Kosovo institutions. The lack of clarity on what best Euro-
pean standards are in the judiciary also negatively affected the executive function.53 The 
ECA review found in the same vein that intra-EU political coordination and guidance was 
not fully ensured through the establishment of the EU Special Representative (EUSR).54 
This resulted in limited coherence in political messaging from different EU stakehold-
ers towards the host government and population, as coordination depended greatly on 
the personal relationship between the EUSR and the Head of EULEX.55 EULEX’s impact 
is widely perceived as mostly positive when it comes to support provided to structured 
EU initiatives such as the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and the visa liberalisation process, 
“which would otherwise be difficult to implement” without operational human resources 
49 Interview 2.
50 Ibid., 31: Jacqué 2015, 18.
51 Interview 3.
52 ECA 2012, 29.
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deployed in the field. But here too there is space for greater coordination and coherence 
among different EU actors under the EUSR.56
In sum, lack of consensus among EU member states on Kosovo and in effect EULEX 
caused the mission’s struggles to implement its ambitious mandate in full in a timely, 
efficient and cost-effective manner. EULEX has become more effective from an EU per-
spective in the second half of its mandate, as it has made a series of adjustments following 
external criticism, but it still experiences significant challenges when it comes to staffing, 
transition from executive to supporting functions and implementing an overall coherent 
approach with other EU actors in Kosovo. 
Has EUCAP NESTOR/Somalia achieved the EU’s strategic goals and operational objectives?
Similarly to its approach in the Western Balkans and as stated in the Strategic Framework 
for the Horn of Africa, the European Union’s interests in the Horn are: “defined by the 
region’s geo-strategic importance, the EU’s historic engagement with the countries in the 
region, its desire to support the welfare of the people and help lift them from poverty into 
self-sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own citizens from 
the threats that emanate from some parts of the region and address common challenges”.57 
To this end, CSDP priorities for security provision in the Horn of Africa have been piracy-
focused. In June 2008, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1816, which authorised third party 
states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use all means necessary to combat 
piracy. The EU launched its first naval counter-piracy operation, NAVFOR Atlanta, off the 
coast of Somalia in December 2008. Drawing on the Strategic Framework for the Horn 
of Africa, which called for a regional approach, the Union launched EUCAP Nestor in 
July 2012 with an initial budget of €11.9 million.58 EUCAP Nestor was the first civilian 
CSDP mission to have a regional focus.59 It was created to complement simultaneous EU 
operations, EUNAVFOR Atlanta and the EU Military Training Mission in Somalia.60 EU-
CAP Nestor also worked alongside other regional and international actors operating in 
56 IECEU roundtable of experts: Balkans 2016.
57 Council of the European Union 2011b, 4.
58 Council of the European Union 2011a; Council of the European Union 2012.
59 Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013, 9.
60 EEAS 2016d.
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the Horn of Africa, including the United Nations,61 the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO)62 and Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP).63
EUCAP Nestor was initially mandated to operate in four countries: Djibouti, Somalia, 
Seychelles and Tanzania. After a comprehensive review undertaken by the EU in 2015 
the mission, renamed EUCAP Somalia, was reframed to focus solely on that country. 
EUCAP’s redefined aim is to bolster Somalia’s maritime security force, strengthen its abil-
ity to fight piracy and increase its overall capacity to patrol its territorial waters.64Its core 
objective is to build capacity to cover the entire process of prosecuting acts of piracy 
“from crime to court”.65 In pursuit of this purpose, EUCAP was intended to work with key 
maritime security actors within Somalia, including the coast guards, navy, police forces, 
judges and prosecutors.66 Together, EUCAP experts and their Somali counterparts were 
to improve “existing legal and law enforcement frameworks related to anti-piracy and [to 
develop] relevant maritime security capacity instruments”.67
In order to fulfil its aims, EUCAP provides advice, mentoring and training in three areas of 
expertise: legal, maritime and policing. EUCAP facilitates basic coast guard training as well 
as expert training in diverse fields from law drafting to engineering. EUCAP experts have 
been placed within local maritime security authorities in order to provide additional sup-
port and guidance and to assist in the development of organisational structures.68 In the Eu-
ropean External Action Service’s own words: “Strategic level advice is complemented by the 
coordination and facilitation of specialised training to support capacity-building efforts”.69
61 The United Nations is very active in the Horn of Africa. Of particular note is the United Na-
tions Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP). UNSOM was established on 3 June 2013. It provides policy advice to the 
Somali government and to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in a variety of 
areas, including governance, democratisation, security and donor relations (UNSOM, no date). 
UNDP is the UN’s global development network and mainly concentrates on sustainable de-
velopment, democratic governance and peacebuilding, climate change and disaster resilience 
(UNDP, no date).
62 IMO is a UN agency dedicated to safeguarding and securing international shipping as well as 
working to end pollution from ships (IMO, no date). 
63 OBP is a non-profit organisation that was formed in 2010 to ‘[mobilise] stakeholders from the 
maritime community, [develop] public-private partnerships to promote long-term solutions at 
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EUCAP’s greatest achievements are related to its training and workshop programmes 
provided throughout the Horn of Africa. Partnering with local and international experts, 
EUCAP has facilitated trainings on both theoretical and practical aspects of maritime 
security. These trainings have been successful both in terms of operational objectives re-
lated to skills and knowledge transfers, but also by increasing cooperation between EU-
CAP and regional actors as well as between the regional actors themselves as per the EU’s 
strategy. Additionally, trainings were conducted using a variety of EUCAP Nestor staff 
from trainers and experts from Seychelles and Djibouti to navy and coast guard personnel 
from a number of countries both within and outside the Horn.70
Nevertheless, from an EU perspective, EUCAP has a mixed record so far. As a civilian 
CSDP mission, it has advanced the EU’s overall strategic goal of strengthening the soft 
capacity of navies, coast guards and police forces, as well as criminal and legal justice sys-
tems in the region. Furthermore, EUCAP has successfully achieved internal EU objectives 
such as empowering locals through capacity development and training. However, looking 
at the impact on piracy reduction off the coast of Somalia, a strategic goal for the Union, 
EUCAP has not been as directly effective as other EU operations such as NAVFOR Ata-
lanta. The subsequent sections will explain why.
Has EUCAP Nestor/Somalia’s implementation been timely, efficient and cost-effective?
Contrary to the EULEX experience in Kosovo, contributing to EUCAP’s achievements 
in Somalia has been its efforts to complement other EU actions in the region. “Together, 
EUCAP NESTOR, Atalanta and EUTM form a coherent, integrated CSDP package sup-
porting the EU’s Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”.71 While this has been ac-
complished in several ways, two areas stand out. First, EUCAP Nestor and EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta’s mandates complement each other with both supporting the EU’s strategic goals 
for peace and stability in the region. The two missions do this in different focus areas and 
through different approaches, but both support capacity-building specifically with regard 
to maritime security provision.72 Second, EUCAP Nestor and Atalanta have supported 
each other in practical terms. Representatives from the two missions frequently visit one 
70 One example of a successful training was the 2013 maritime security course for 14 high-level 
individuals on board the HNLMS Johan de Witt. The training focused on building leadership 
capabilities and increasing knowledge of maritime legal matters through learning sessions and 
practical exercises. A second example was a training session co-hosted by EUCAP Nestor and 
the Federal Government of Somalia in 2015. This workshop included individuals from across 
Somali regional governments and law enforcement agencies as well as representatives from in-
ternational stakeholders such as UNSOM, EUNAVFOR, EUTM Somalia and the UK embassy. 
The workshop served as a forum to continue “enhancing and strengthening knowledge, under-
standing, cooperation and cohesion among the different maritime-security entities in Somalia.” 
EEAS 2015.
71 EEAS no date.
72 Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013.
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another and attend similar events as well as planning joint activities such as trainings.73 
The complementary nature of EUCAP Nestor and other EU activities in the region, par-
ticularly EUNAVFOR Atalanta, is a strong feature in EUCAP Nestor’s implementation 
and provides an example of coordination potentially to be reproduced by other missions 
or in other areas. 
While EUCAP Nestor’s training programmes have had some success, the long-term sus-
tainability of its trainings is a strategic issue that must be addressed, particularly EUCAP 
Nestor’s focus on ‘soft’ capacity-building, such as advice and training. This focus is not 
aligned with the priorities of affected countries and their need for equipment such as 
boats and weapons or improved coastguard infrastructure.74 Thus, while EUCAP Nestor 
has provided training and knowledge-transfer necessary for capacity-building, its man-
date did not include a remit to provide the ‘hard’ capacity needed to apply the new train-
ing and skills.75 One EUCAP Nestor official put it this way: “[w]hen you train somebody 
they pass it on to others in their organisations. If there are no buildings, no operation 
centres, no schools, there is nothing to maintain this knowledge”.76
While EUCAP Nestor trainings and advice have achieved internal EU objectives, the 
mandate’s implementation has not been entirely timely, efficient or cost effective. First, 
many of its early engagements occurred in the broader region, limiting its activities in So-
malia, where the piracy problem was focused. Second, despite these early regional efforts 
EUCAP NESTOR has had limited impact and sustainability in the wider region. Third, 
many local recipients of EUCAP training lack the necessary equipment and facilities to 
implement the training, meaning that they are not getting the full benefits of EUCAP 
NESTOR activities, nor are they able to sustain the actions critical to reducing piracy in 
the region in the long term.77
With these findings in mind, one might question the timeliness of the mission as a whole 
as well as its efficiency and cost-effectiveness in achieving the EU’s strategic goals. The 
mission was relatively effective in implementing its operational objectives, but this does 
not necessarily make it timely, efficient and cost-effective from a strategic perspective. 
This illustrates how the internal EU perspective is linked to the external preventive per-
spective, as it is in the Union’s interest to contribute meaningfully to security provision in 
the country and region in which it deploys. This leads us to the next part of the analysis, 
which examines external perspectives on the two missions’ effectiveness.  
73 EEAS 2016b; EEAS 2016c.
74 Bueger 2013.
75 Ibid.
76 Quoted in Ejdus 2017, 13.
77 Rodt et al. 2017.
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Operational Effectiveness from a Preventive Security Perspective
Having appraised the two missions from an internal EU perspective, this next section will 
examine them from an external perspective focused on security provision on the ground. 
It asks whether each mission has (a) made a meaningful contribution to preventing fur-
ther insecurity (b) without using disproportionate measures to that end. 
Has EULEX Kosovo contributed to preventing further insecurity?
A 2011 Saferworld survey found the perceived likelihood of renewed conflict in Kosovo de-
creasing. People felt safer and rightly so. To date, there has been no further violent conflict. 
The question for this research is whether and if so how EULEX has helped prevent further 
violence. Saferworld reported generally positive public perceptions of EULEX’s impact on 
law enforcement and justice, in spite of marked frustrations with both sectors and dispari-
ties between respondents of different ethnicities.78 Civil society representatives interviewed 
for this study, who consider the mission generally inefficient, inadequate and unaccount-
able, perceive EULEX less favourably, however.79 Overall, it is believed to provide inappro-
priate support to the Kosovo Police, which is now considered more professional, effective 
and trusted by larger parts of the population.80 Although its reputation has suffered due to 
political crises and corruption allegations, civil society respondents no longer believe that 
the Kosovo Police requires the level or kind of support that EULEX provides.81
Closer scrutiny reveals that external assessments of EULEX’s contribution on the ground 
depend on the timeframe, location and activities in question. Of the locations where EU-
LEX has operated, it is perceived by civil society representatives to have had the most 
positive impact on preventing insecurity in the northern regions of Kosovo, where the 
threat of renewed violence is most significant.82 In particular, EULEX is thought to have 
had a positive effect through its policing mandate and MMA work with police, justice 
and customs authorities, as well as on court cases related to war crimes and organised 
crime.83 The majority of interviewees suggest that EULEX was most effective in prevent-
78 Saferworld 2011, 28−29.
79 This assessment is based on perception surveys and interviews of representatives of a sample of 
independent civil society organisations mainly human rights and peacebuilding organisations, 
women’s groups and think tanks. It does not claim to be representative of the whole of Kosovo 
society. It can also not be claimed that people’s perceptions reflected in the surveys fully dis-
tinguish EULEX’s impact from that of other EU and international activities. Having said that, 
the mission is widely known by the public and civil society organisations in Kosovo, some of 
which have actively engaged with the mission. Their answers therefore inform the assessment 
of external perspectives on EULEX overtime, space and function.
80 Interviews 11 and 12; The Kosovo Police remains the most trusted police force in the region, 
according to the Kosovo Security Barometer 2016, 8.
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ing conflict in areas and at times where the Kosovo Police was unable to deploy, and where 
tensions between Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian communities were most likely to 
turn violent. As an executive force and a trusted intermediary between Serbian police 
and Kosovo state institutions, EULEX played a de-escalatory role through community 
policing and confidence-building. In particular, the MMA work was viewed as having had 
a meaningful impact and included input from civil society through regular, thematic and 
technical consultations.84
Perceptions regarding the impact of EULEX’s justice mandate were more mixed than for 
the security sector. With executive powers to investigate and prosecute serious and sensi-
tive crimes, EULEX’s potential to make a meaningful contribution to addressing impunity 
for violence, war crimes and corruption, all key conflict drivers that have fuelled vio-
lence in the region, was widely perceived as high. Nevertheless, civil society organisations 
involved in the justice sector lament poor delivery overall. A backlog of up to tens of 
thousands of cases in some courts indicate that EULEX and other actors supporting the 
Kosovo judicial system have failed in this respect.85 Enforcement of decisions was raised 
as equally problematic, as the 2012 ECA report estimated, only 40per cent of Court rul-
ings in Kosovo were enforced. This has created frustration among the population and civil 
society organisations involved in transitional justice and criminal prosecution. This was 
stressed in particular for cases related to elite corruption, which EULEX has been criti-
cised for not pursuing enough in the eyes of local populations and civil society.86
EULEX’s ambitious mandate combined with its lack of concrete deliverables led to high 
expectations in Kosovo. At its launch, the mission was widely expected to prosecute se-
nior political figures involved in alleged crime and corruption. On this account, EULEX 
has disappointed. However, with regard to its contribution to preventing further instabil-
ity, the mission has made a meaningful contribution in particular in the North, where the 
risk was highest. It has had a direct impact on security provision through policing, but 
also an indirect effect on the provision of security through rule of law. To date, EULEX has 
contributed to preventing further violence in Kosovo. The question now is, whether with 
waning local support the mission may lose its ability to contribute meaningfully without 
using disproportionate measures to that end.
Did EULEX Kosovo apply proportional measures?
With executive powers and a wide range of tools and resources at its disposal, the EULEX 
mission was perceived as promising at its launch in 2008. A decade on, the political con-
text has changed, its mandate has narrowed and the threat of large-scale violence has de-
creased.87 Even though the mission was downsized to 800 staff in 2017, EULEX’s resources 
84 Interview 12.
85 European Commission 2016, 37; Interview 10.
86 Saferworld 2011; Interviews 9−14.
87 Interviews 3, 6, 9, 10 and 11; Council of the EU 2016b.
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are still deemed by all civil society respondents interviewed for this project as dispropor-
tionately high in view of its results.88 EULEX is no longer deemed to deliver effective se-
curity provision on the ground proportional to the resources invested in it. When asked, 
respondents put forward several reasons why the mission might not fulfil its potential. 
These echoed public perception surveys, which lamented a lack of accountability towards 
Kosovo’s people. Mission staff was seen to be working towards the interests of the EU 
member states that pay their salaries, which has not created cohesion around the man-
date of the mission or indeed the needs of the local population.89 The mission’s reputation 
was further tarnished by corruption allegations.90 In 2014 EULEX officials stood accused 
of bribery and inappropriate involvement with Kosovo officials suspected of corruption. 
These allegations covered by local and international media proved damaging to the cred-
ibility of the mission, which is mandated to fight corruption.91 This has caused decreasing 
trust in EULEX from local civil society and populations.92 Connected to the issue of trust-
worthiness is a perceived lack of transparency and adequate scrutiny of EULEX actions, 
especially concerning its coercive power through the executive mandate. Respondents 
agree that the mission neither consults nor communicates well enough with the people 
that are supposed to be its primary beneficiaries. Likewise, its monitoring and evaluation 
processes are neither perceived as transparent nor participatory.93 After a period of regu-
lar consultations during its initial deployment, formal dialogues between EULEX and civil 
society have decreased and informal exchanges are reported as non-existent, in spite of 
requests therefore.94 Respondents see this withdrawal from local level dialogue as a major 
impediment to the mission fulfilling its potential. 
In 2011 Saferworld reported that: “EULEX continues to be criticised for performing be-
low expectations. Surprisingly, this is notwithstanding the fact that people increasingly 
think that the mission had a positive impact on the performance of key justice and secu-
rity providers in the country.”95 Today the first part of the statement holds true, as popular 
expectations remain unfulfilled, while the benefits referred to in the second part of the 
statement seem further away. The majority of civil society respondents perceive EULEX’s 
contemporary contribution as disproportionate, weak or negligible. The discrepancy be-
tween strategic ambitions, operational means and actual delivery on the ground is con-
sidered so high that civil society organisations consulted for this study no longer see the 
mission as an added value for Kosovo, whether this is to prevent violence or build peace 
through the rule of law. This clashes slightly with local perceptions reported by the 2016 
88 Council of the EU 2016.
89 Interview 12, 13 and 14.
90 Interview 12, 13 and 14.
91 Borger 2014; Capussela 2015a.
92 Tabak and Xharra 2014; KCSS 2016, 13−14.
93 Interviews 9−14; Saferworld 2011.
94 Palm 2010; Interviews 9−14.
95 Saferworld 2011.
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Kosovo Security Barometer. Although frustrations and distrust towards EULEX have nev-
er been greater, a small majority of respondents still favour a continued EULEX presence 
in Kosovo.96 Thus, while this study shows that EULEX is widely perceived as wasteful and 
inadequate, it also shows continued disagreements regarding the proportionality of the 
mission’s means and whether its overall contribution is meaningful enough to justify its 
presence. This remains a question of whether the glass is half-full or half-empty, and as 
the EU tends to do in the Western Balkans, it seems willing to air on the side of caution 
‘just in case’. 
Has EUCAP Nestor/Somalia contributed to preventing further insecurity?
EUCAP Nestor has been commended for being the first maritime mission to adopt an 
inclusive regional approach to enhancing maritime security, governance and rule of law 
in the Horn of Africa.97 During its mandate, EUCAP has operated across borders includ-
ing operations in Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania. The Horn of Africa faces a 
number of shared security challenges, as identified in the regional conflict analysis above. 
Taking a regional approach and establishing cooperative partnerships in the region is 
therefore critical. Cooperation between the different Horn governments is especially im-
portant; as it would be impossible to sustain systematic security provision such as an 
effective anti-piracy campaign without the support and coordination of regional actors. 
Regional cooperation opens the door to opportunities beyond combating piracy at sea. It 
provides space for “capacity building in the area of maritime domain awareness, judicial 
enforcement, information sharing, asset facility sharing and joint counter-piracy/terror-
ism exercises”.98 With its initial regional focus, EUCAP Nestor, thus, supported the EU’s 
regional priorities to foster peace and help provide security throughout the Horn.99
Nestor’s focus on civilian-based maritime security has had a positive impact in terms of 
building local capacities throughout the region. However, problems persist. A significant 
one concerns early capacity-building programmes in the country, where regional secu-
rity problems such as piracy originate. EUCAP Nestor did not operate in Somalia for 
the first two years of its mandate, despite the piracy problem stemming from within that 
country.100 As a result: “the mission [did not have] a significant impact on the ability of 
Somali authorities to improve policing and rule of law” in these first two years.101 In part 
to remedy this issue, the EU refocused and renamed EUCAP Somalia, shifting its man-
date to focus on that country from 2016 onwards. Consequently, the mission expanded its 
Hargeisa field office, established an operations’ base in Puntland and increased its pres-
96 KCSS 2016.
97 Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013.
98 Onuoha 2010, 212.
99 Council of the European Union 2011b, 4.
100 Ejdus 2017, 11.
101 Quoted in Ejdus 2017, 11.
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ence at the Mogadishu headquarters.102 While this may be considered a ‘better late than 
never’ reshuffle, it does illustrate willingness on the part of the EU and EUCAP to adapt 
the mission to better fulfil its preventive potential. Due to its regional approach and focus 
on capacity-building, EUCAP NESTOR has contributed to strengthening security provi-
sion in the Horn of Africa, and later Somalia’s ability to respond to piracy and other mari-
time security issues. However, EUCAP NESTOR’s contributions are less effective than 
other engagements such as EUNAVFOR and measures that focus more directly on secu-
rity provision such as increased patrols and higher security for ships. The next question, 
therefore, is whether EUCAP applied proportional measures of prevention.
Did EUCAP Nestor/Somalia apply proportional measures?
EUCAP’s approach of building capacity through the promotion of local ownership can be 
seen specifically in the mission’s efforts to strengthen maritime capabilities and the rule of 
law in Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug. This was pursued via onshore trainings, sup-
port for a coastal police force and the training of judges in Puntland.103 EUCAP Nestor en-
couraged the Federal Somali Government and Somali Regional States, including Somalil-
and, to meet with international partners such as the UN and OBP. One of the meetings 
between these entities led to the May 2016 opening of the Interim Operations Room for 
the Somaliland Coast Guard.104 This and related initiatives sought to enhance awareness 
and capacity for maritime management and coordinated security responses.105 EUCAP’s 
engagement with authorities in Somaliland is an example of the process and results of lo-
cal buy-in. EUCAP Nestor and the Republic of Somaliland agreed that the mission would 
take a ‘bottom up’ approach aligned with Somaliland’s National Maritime Development 
Plans.106 Another practical example of EUCAP Nestor’s promotion of local ownership can 
be seen in its work with the Somaliland Coast Guard to develop a website.107 EUCAP facil-
itated partnership between a Somaliland IT expert and the coast guard’s self-educated IT 
team. Internally, the project was considered a success, especially as it was perceived as a 
project “by Somalilanders for Somalilanders”.108 The approach exemplified in that project 
provides support for the EU to prioritise local ownership and community engagement. By 
making these principles a priority, EU missions are likely to improve both in terms of their 
ability to enhance local capacity and the amount of local engagement in and support for 
the missions, which is essential to their success. 
102 EEAS 2016a, 20.
103 Holzer and Jürgenliemk 2012, 9.
104 EEAS 2016a, 20.
105 Ibid.
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While EUCAP’s mission highlights the importance of a locally owned approach, and while 
there have been instances of local ownership. Overall, “EUCAP Nestor has struggled to 
achieve ownership because it implemented ownership as an externally driven, top-down 
endeavour”; an assessment echoed by internal and external commentators alike.109 These 
issues are further highlighted by the fact that it was not until the refocusing of EUCAP 
Nestor and during the process of creating a new operational plan for EUCAP Somalia that 
the Somali government was fully consulted about its needs. Thus, it was only five years 
into the mission that key government actors were consulted and the Somali maritime 
context was appropriately reflected and incorporated into the mission mandate.110 EU-
CAP was further distanced from the local context due to the EU mission’s structure, man-
agement style and “the tendency to micro-manage the mission from Brussels”.111 External 
actors have criticised the bureaucracy that accompanied the operation on the EU side, 
accusing it of alienating local actors, damaging their trust in the EU and EUCAP, while it 
“overwhelmed the mission with red tape”.112
The EU has increasingly engaged in and funded activities in the Horn of Africa such as 
EUCAP Nestor with the aim of promoting security, but its efforts have suffered from lack 
of cohesion and a mismatch between means and ends. Overall, EU policy towards the 
Horn of Africa prioritises security and stability through an underlying theme of promot-
ing ‘African solutions to African problems’.113 This approach is intended to build Africa’s 
capacity to address its own problems, minimising external interventions, and encourag-
ing the emergence of African institutions such as IGAD and the AU.114 EU programmes 
and priorities in the Horn, such as EUCAP, however, frequently fail to adequately take 
into account the local context and the limited governmental and institutional capacity 
in the region.115 EUCAP Nestor was the first mission of its kind and as such it can serve 
as a useful learning model for future EU actions. Both in terms of its achievements and 
challenges EUCAP provides valuable lessons for regional engagements both in the Horn 
of Africa and elsewhere.116
In sum, EUCAP has had significant achievements and challenges. EUCAP’s achievements 
include the political backing the mission fostered in the region, e.g. in the Seychelles and 
Somaliland, trainings throughout the Horn of Africa and the mission’s complementary 
109 Ejdus 2017, 10: “The EU designed the mission according to its own needs, interests and re-
sources and then tried to sell it to its local counterparts. As a result, the overall degree of local 
ownership has been low, while the impact on the local and regional capacity to fight piracy has 
been either negligible or unsustainable.”
110 Ejdus 2018, 36.
111 Ibid., 12.
112 Ibid.
113 Sicurelli and Fabrinni 2011, 52; Kempin and Scheler 2016, 40l.
114 Mays, 2003.
115 Gibert 2006, 148.
116 Madsen and Kane-Hartnett 2013.
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nature with other EU activities. EUCAP has provided learning on leadership in maritime 
security, capacity-building and political cooperation around the Horn of Africa. A pri-
mary lesson identified is that while EUCAP aimed to be a locally owned mission with re-
gional reach, it succeeded in achieving this primarily through framework creation rather 
than realities in the mission and on the ground. One of the central failings of the mission 
was its initial lack of operations in Somalia, which was a glaring gap, as much of the in-
security in the region stems from there. EUCAP failed to take local needs and contexts 
sufficiently into account in creating mission priorities, prioritising its own agenda rather 
than realities on the ground.117 In order to improve future missions the EU must ensure 
that it operates in mission-critical areas, that it creates trainings that are sustainable and 
supported by local capacity, that it understands the local context and consults local gov-
ernment, civil society and affected groups among local populations. By doing this, the 
EU could better ensure that its efforts contribute meaningful, proportional prevention of 
further insecurity. 
Concluding Lessons for the Future
This contribution appraised the EU’s approach to security provision in the Western Bal-
kans and the Horn of Africa. It focused on capabilities developed under the Common Se-
curity and Defence Policy and whether their application matched EU regional strategies 
to address security needs on the ground. The purpose of this endeavour was to examine 
whether the EU’s capabilities are sufficient and appropriate to reach its expectations – 
and those of others – in preventing violence and promoting peace in both regions. The 
conclusion is that EU engagements in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa have 
made meaningful contributions to preventing further insecurity in both regions but with 
results generally falling short of both internal and external expectations. The EU’s regional 
strategies constitute a relevant response to local challenges and should be sustained and 
developed further, but with more context-specific and adaptive flexibility on the ground. 
To implement these regional strategies to the levels of expectation, the EU must continue 
its efforts to develop coherent, integrated CSDP packages supporting its overall strategic 
ambitions and responding directly to the complex security challenges at hand. To this end, 
it is essential that EU actors and agencies work well together to identify context-specific 
priorities. Likewise, the EU must work more closely and consistently with international, 
regional and particularly local actors, including them through continuous consultation 
and cooperation at all stages from strategy development, fact-finding and planning phases 
to the launch, implementation, revision, transition and withdrawal of CSDP missions. 
This study took a closer look at two such missions. EULEX Kosovo and EUCAP Nestor/
Somalia both provide lessons for future missions to be undertaken by the EU, or indeed 
other organisations and entities that plan similar initiatives. The most important lessons 
117 Ejdus 2018, 39−40.
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from both case studies relate to the importance of: (1) clear and focused mission man-
dates with concrete benchmarks and verifiable indicators of success that respond to the 
most important needs on the ground; (2) clarity, consistency and predictability in politi-
cal support from Member States and institutions staffing, equipping and sustaining the 
mission throughout its implementation; and (3) sufficient structures for recruiting and 
retaining appropriate human resources and proper procurement for such deployments. 
Further lessons identified stress the significance of (4) fostering deeper cooperation with 
and between countries in host regions, and (5) including local actors in the process of 
strengthening governments, governance, institutions, rule of law and provision of secu-
rity. This is crucial to ensure that the EU does not set internal goals that prioritise short-
term security at the cost of the external need for long-term development since both are 
key to preventing further insecurity and building a sustainable peace. 
67
Peen Rodt et al.: The EU Approach to Security Provision in the Western Balkans and ...
References
African Research Bulletin. 2008. Djibouti-Eritrea: Fighting on Border. 45 (6): 17758–
17559. 
Al Jazeera. 2017. “Somalia soldiers end deadly al-Shabaab restaurant siege.” Accessed 
July 22, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/somalia-soldiers-deadly-al-
shabab-restaurant-siege-170615063902798.html.
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). 2016. Balkan Jihadists: 
Radicalization and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq. March. Accessed July 
20, 2017. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/file/show/Balkan-Jihadists.pdf. 
Baniela, Santiago Iglesias and Rios, Juan Vinagre. 2012. “Piracy in Somalia: A 
Challenge to the International Community.” Journal of Navigation 65 (4): 693–710. 
Bereketeab, Redie. 2011. “Rethinking State-Building in the Horn of Africa: 
Challenges of Striking a Balance between Traditional and Modern Institutions.” 
African Studies 70 (3): 376–392. 
Borger, Julian. 2014. “EU’s biggest foreign mission in turmoil over corruption row.” 
The Guardian. November 5, 2014. Accessed July 17, 2017. https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/nov/05/eu-facing-questions-dismissal-prosecutor-alleged-
corruption. 
Boštjančič Pulko, Ivana and Nina Pejič. 2016. “Drawing Lessons Learnt on 
Operational Capabilities of EU’s CSDP Missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” European Perspectives – Journal on European Perspectives of the 
Western Balkans 8 (2): 116 – 136.
Bueger, Christian. 2013. “In search for a mission? The EU’s regional training mission 
EUCAP Nestor.” Accessed August 31, 2017. http://piracy-studies.org/in-search-for-a-
mission-the-eus-regional-training-mission-eucap-nestor/. 
Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The structure of 
international security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van der Borgh, Chris. 2016. “EU peacebuilding capabilities in Kosovo after 2008: an 
analysis of EULEX and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogues”. Centre for 
Conflict Studies: Utrecht University.
Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo. 2015. State-Building in Kosovo. Democracy, Corruption 
and the EU in the Balkans. London, New York: I. B. Tauris.
68
Journal of Regional Security Vol. 14 № 2 2019
Capussela Andrea Lorenzo. 2015a. “EULEX report exposes EU failure in Kosovo.” EU 
Observer. April 16. Accessed July 17, 2017. https://euobserver.com/opinion/128343. 
Čarapić, Jovana. 2014. “Handgun Ownership and Armed Violence in the Western 
Balkans.” Small Arms Survey. September. Accessed August 3, 2017. http://www.
smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-AV-IB4-Western-Balkans.pdf.
Council of the European Union. 2003. European Security Strategy: a secure Europe in 
a better world. Brussels, 12 December.
Council of the European Union. 2016. Press release 327/16, June 14. http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/14-eulex-kosovo-budget/.
Council of the European Union. 2008. Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 
February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX 
Kosovo. Accessed April 4, 2017. http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/
WEJointActionEULEX_EN.pdf. 
Council of the European Union. 2011a. Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa: 




Council of the European Union. 2011b. Outcomes of Proceedings, 16858/11, 
14 November. Accessed July 7, 2017. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016858%202011%20INIT. 
Council of the European Union. 2012. Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP. Official 
Journal of the European Union.July16. Accessed July 7, 2017. http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede121112cd389_/
sede121112cd389_en.pdf. 
Council of the European Union. 2014. Regulation (EU) no 230/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument 
contributing to stability and peace. Official Journal of the European Union. L77. 15 
March. pp. Art. 3-5.
Council of the European Union. 2018. “EUCAP Somalia: mission extended, budget 




Peen Rodt et al.: The EU Approach to Security Provision in the Western Balkans and ...
DW. 2017. “Al-Shabab attacks Kenya military base, dozens killed.” January 28. 
Accessed July 22. http://www.dw.com/en/al-shabab-attacks-kenya-military-base-
dozens-killed/a-37311441. 
Ejdus, Filip. 2017. “‘Here is your mission, now own it!’ The rhetoric and practice of 
local ownership in EU interventions.” European Security 26 (4): 1–24. 
Ejdus, Filip 2018. “Local ownership as international governmentality: Evidence from 
the EU mission in the Horn of Africa.” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (1): 28–50. 
Elek, Bojan, Muk, Stevo and Milena Milosevic. 2016. Back to basics: reaffirming the 
rule of law in the Western Balkans. Podgorica: Institute Alternativa.
Elmi, Afyare,  Ladan Affi, Andy Knight, and Said Mohamed. 2015. “Piracy in the 
Horn of Africa Waters: Definitions, History, and Modern Causes.” African Security 8 
(3): 147–165. 
EU Council Secretariat. 2005. EU Council Secretariat Factsheet – EU police 
advisory team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. December. 
Accessed August 25, 2017. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eupat/pdf/01122005_factsheet_eupat_en.pdf.
EUCAP Somalia. 2017. “European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia. 
EUCAP Somalia.” Accessed August 3, 2017. http://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet. 
EULEX. 2019. “EULEX – European Rule of Law Mission Kosovo.” Accessed August 
8, 2019. https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/.
EULEX. no date. “EULEX Accountability.” Accessed July 13, 2017. http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/?page=2,23.
EUNAVFOR Somalia. no date. “Mission.” Accessed April 11 2019. https://eunavfor.
eu/deployed-units/surface-vessels/#news-tabs. 
EUPOL Proxima. 2003. “European Union Police Mission PROXIMA – Fact Sheet, 
December 2003.” Accessed August 25, 2017. http://fedtrust.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/Crisis_Management_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
European Commission. 2016. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2016 




Journal of Regional Security Vol. 14 № 2 2019
European Commission. 2016a. Actions in support of peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention in the Horn of Africa within the EU Emergency Trust Fund. Brussels: EU 
Commission.
European Commission. 2017. 2017 Economic Reform Programmes of Albania, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. June. Accessed July 21, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/ip055_en.pdf, 
European Commission. 2017a. ACP – The Cotonou Agreement. https://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en.
European Court of Auditors (ECA). 2012. European Union Assistance to Kosovo 
Related to the Rule of Law, Special Report n.º 18, Luxembourg: European Court of 
Auditors. http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR12_18/SR12_18_
EN.PDF
European Parliament. 1993. Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen European 
Council on the 21st and 21nd June 1993. Accessed August 7, 2017. http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm.
European Parliament. 2015. The Western Balkans and the EU Enlargement: 
Lessons learned, ways forward and prospects ahead. Accessed August 7, 2017 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/534999/EXPO_
IDA%282015%29534999_EN.pdf.
European Parliament. 2016. The Berlin Process and Regional Cooperation in the 
Western Balkans: How to make agreements more effective and efficient? Accessed 
August 7, 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586602/
EPRS_BRI(2016)586602_EN.pdf.
European External Action (EEAS). 2012. Common Security and Defence Policy – 
European Union Mission in Bosnia And Herzegovina (EUPM), June 2012. Accessed 
August 25, 2017 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/
eupm-bih/pdf/25062012_factsheet_eupm-bih_en.pdf.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2013. EUCAP Nestor Welcomes Successful 
Completion of Senior Maritime Security Course on board EU Naval Force Flagship, 
26 August. Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/press_office/
news/367/?year=2013&month=12. 
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2014a. EUCAP Nestor assists 
Somaliland Coastguard (SLCG) in boosting external communication, 9 
71
Peen Rodt et al.: The EU Approach to Security Provision in the Western Balkans and ...
December. Accessed July 7, 2017. https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/press_office/
news/945/?year=2014&month=12.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2014b. Regional Maritime Security 
Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean 
(EUCAP Nestor). November. Accessed July 7, 2017 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-operations/eucap-nestor/documents/factsheet_
eucap_nestor_en.pdf.
European External Action (EEAS). 2014a. EU Common Security and Defence Policy 
– European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan. February 
2014. Accessed August 25, 2017. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-
and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/pdf/factsheet_euavsec_south-sudan_en.pdf
European External Action (EEAS). 2014b. Common Security and Defence Policy 
– EULEX Kosovo – EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, October 2014. Accessed 
on August 25, 2017. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/factsheet_eulex_kosovo_en.pdf. 
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2015. PR21_2015: Maritime security 
workshop held in Mogadishu. 27 May. Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.eucap-
nestor.eu/en/press_office/news/1282/?year=2015&month=12.
European External Action (EEAS). 2015a. European Union Common Security and 
Defence Policy – EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation 
EUFOR Althea). January 2015. Accessed August 25, 2017. http://eeas.europa.eu/
archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_
en.pdf.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016. Missions and Operations Annual 
Report 2016. Brussels: European Union External Action Service.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016a. Common Security and Defence 
Policy of the European Union: Missions and Operations Annual Report. Brussels: 
European Union External Action. Accessed July 7, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/
eeas/files/e_csdp_annual_report1.pdf. 
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016b. EUCAP Nestor and EU NAVFOR 
Atalanta seek further synergies for enhancing maritime capacity building in Somalia. 
23 June. Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/press_office/
news/1367/?year=2016&month=12.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016c. EUCAP Nestor’s Maritime 
Advisor embarks on EU NAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta flagship. 18 August. 
72
Journal of Regional Security Vol. 14 № 2 2019
Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/press_office/
news/1391/?year=2016&month=12.
European External Action Service (EEAS). 2016d. EU Maritime Security Capacity 
Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Nestor). November. Accessed on 7 July, 2017. 
https://www.eucap-nestor.eu/data/file/1427/EUCN_Factsheet_November_2016.
qF1oOOwtvM.pdf. 
European External Action (EEAS). 2017a. Common European Defence Policy – 
European Union Training Mission – Somalia. August, 2017. Accessed August 25, 
2017, https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/about-us/.
European External Action (EEAS). 2017b. Common Security and Defence Policy – EU 
Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia). February 2017. Accessed 
on August 25, 2017. https://www.eucap-som.eu/fact-sheet/.
European External Action Service (EEAS). no date. “Common Security and Defence 
Policy: EUCAP Nestor.” Accessed July 9, 2017.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/
sede012313factsheeteucapnestor_/sede012313factsheeteucapnestor_en.pdf. 
European Union. 1999. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). 
Accessed August 7, 2017. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ar18003. 
Gibert, Marie 2006. “The European Union in the IGAD-Subregion: Insights from 
Sudan & Somalia.” Review of African Political Economy 33 (107): 142–150. 
Government of Montenegro. 2016. Regional Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment. Accessed July 21, 2017. http://www.mvr.gov.mk/Upload/Editor_Upload/
analizi-statistiki/Socta%20izvestaj%202016%20ENG.pdf.
Greiçevci, Labinot. 2011. “EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX 
Mission in Kosovo.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12 (3): 283–303.
Grilj, Blaž, and Rok Zupančič 2016. “Assessing the Planning and Implementation of 
the EU Rule of Law Missions: Case Study of EULEX Kosovo.” European Perspectives 
– Journal on European perspectives of the Western Balkans. 8.2 (15): 62–85.
Holzer, Georg-Sebastian, and Hubertus Jürgenliemk. 2012. “The Somali crisis 
and the EU: Moving onshore and committing to Somalia.” GGI Analysis Paper 
5/2012. Brussels: Global Governance Institute. Accessed July 7, 2017. http://
73
Peen Rodt et al.: The EU Approach to Security Provision in the Western Balkans and ...
kops.unikonstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/25612/Holzer_256122.
pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. 
IECEU. 2016. “IECEU roundtable of experts: Balkans.” Accessed 15 July, 2017. http://
www.ieceu-project.com/?p=536. 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). no date. “Frequently Asked Questions.” 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx. Accessed July 22 2017. 
Jacque, Jean-Paul. 2015. “Review of the EULEX Kosovo mission’s implementation of 
the mandate with a particular focus on the handling of recent allegations.” Accessed 
December 11, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/statements- eeas/docs/150331_jacque-
report_en.pdf. 
KCSS. 2016. “Kosovo Security Barometer. Sixth Edition.” http://www.qkss.org/
repository/docs/KSB-Sixth-Edition_327922.pdf.
Kempin, Ronja, and Ronja Scheler. 2016. “The EU in the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa.” In The EU, strategy and security policy: regional and strategic challenges, 
edited by Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov. London: Routledge, 
35–50.
Krešić, Ana, Jakov Milatović, and Peter Sanfey. 2017. “Firm performance 
and obstacles to doing business in the Western Balkans.” European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. January. Accessed July 21, 2017. http://www.ebrd.
com/publications/working-papers/firm-performance.
Kursani, Shpend. 2015. Police Cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia. Belgrade and 
Prishtina: BCSP and KCSS. Accessed 13 July, 2017.
http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/police_cooperation_ks_eng_v3.pdf. 
Kursani, Shpend. 2013. A Comprehensive Analysis of EULEX. What Next? Pristina: 
KIPRED. 
Ladzik, Jeanette. 2009. “EU Military and Civilian Crisis Management Operations: the 
first six years.” The Federal Trust and Global Policy Institute. April 2009. Accessed 
August 25, 2017. http://fedtrust.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Crisis_
Management_Policy_Brief.pdf.
Lyons, Terrence. 2009. “The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the 
Horn of Africa.” Review of African Political Economy 36 (120): 167–180.
74
Journal of Regional Security Vol. 14 № 2 2019
Madsen, Jens Vestergaard, and Liza Kane-Hartnett. 2013. Towards a Regional 
Solution to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities. Broomfield, CO: One Earth 
Future Foundation and Oceans.
Marty, Dick 2011. Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs 
in Kosovo. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on Legal Affairs and 





Maxted, Julia and Abebe Zegeye. 2002. “Human Stability and Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa.” African Security Review 11 (1): 54–59.
Murphy, Sean D. 2016. “The Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998–2000).” In International 
Law and the Use of Force: A Case-Based Approach, edited by Olivier Corten and Tom 
Ruys. GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016–52. Accessed July 23, 
2017. http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2492&context=fac
ulty_publications.
Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP). no date. “About.” Accessed July 19, 2017. http://
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/about. 
Onuoha, Freedom C. 2010. “Piracy and Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: 
Connections, Causes, and Concerns.” African Security 3 (4): 191–215.
 
Palm, Malin 2010. Accountability and Effectiveness of CSDP Missions: The Role of 
Civil Society (The cases of EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL COPPS). EPLO. http://eplo.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/EPLO_CSDP_WG_Study_Accountability_and_
Effectiveness_of_CSDP_Missions.pdf.
Rodt, Annemarie Peen. 2016. “European ‘Stabilisation through Association’: Five 
Lessons for Future Stability.” In Regional Stability and Peacebuilding: Initiating 
Reconciliation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond, edited by David 
Vestenskov. Royal Danish Defence College, 59–76. Accessed July 30, 2019. https://
pure.fak.dk/files/6027145/Regional_Stability_Net.pdf.
Rodt, Annemarie Peen. 2017. “Effectiveness in operational conflict prevention: 
how should we measure it in EU missions and operations”. In Seminar Publication 
on Contemporary Peace Operations – From theory to practice, edited by Elisa 
Norvanto and Hanne Dumur-Laanila. Finnish Defence Forces International Centre: 
FINCENT Publication Series 2/2017, 79–86. Accessed October 6, 2017. http://
75
Peen Rodt et al.: The EU Approach to Security Provision in the Western Balkans and ...
www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/143913/EAPTC_Seminar%20Publication.
pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
Rodt, Annemarie Peen et al. 2017. Report on EU Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa and Western Balkans. EU-CIVCAP Deliverable 
5.1, 1–98. Accessed December 20, 2017. https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.
com/2017/10/eu-civcap_deliverable_5-1.pdf.
Saferworld. 2011. “Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to Act.” 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Kosovo_tracker_survey_2011_
English_reduced.pdf
Sheremeti, Furtuna. 2017. “Understanding Kosovo’s ‘Special Court. Kosovo 
2.0.” March 6. Accessed April 20, 2017. http://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/
understanding-kosovos-special-court. 
Sicurelli, Daniela, and Sergio Fabbrini. 2014. “An institutional approach to foreign 
policy-making: the EU, the USA and crisis management in Africa.” Journal of 
Transatlantic Studies 12 (1): 41–61.
Somaliland Coast Guard. 2015. “Joint Action Plan Somaliland 2014-2016.” September 
8. Accessed August 31, 2017. http://www.somalilandcoastguard.com/assets/2015-09-
12--sl-cpc---eucn---unodc-tripartite-joint-action-plan-v5-1.pdf. 
Tabak, Nate and Jetta Xharra. 2014. “Scandal and Suspicion at the EU’s Kosovo 
Mission.” Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BRIN). November 7. Accessed 
April 20, 2017. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/scandal-and-suspicion-at-
the-eu-s-kosovo-mission-1.
Takele, Alexander. 2017. “Al-Shabaab’s Resurgence in the Horn of Africa: Factors 
Contributing to the Group’s Persistence.” Ifriqiya 3 (1). Accessed July 17, 2017.
http://dayan.org/content/al-shabaab%E2%80%99s-resurgence-horn-africa-factors-
contributing-group%E2%80%99s-persistence.
Tardy, Thierry, ed. 2017. Recasting EU Civilian Crisis Management. Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies.
Tejpar, Johan and Kristina Zetterlund. 2013. “EUCAP Nestor: Trying to Steer Out 
of the Doldrums.” Stockholm: FOI. Accessed July 8, 2017. http://hlo-daktari.de/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/EUCAP-NESTOR-Tejpar-and-Zetterlund-FOI-R-3721.pdf. 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). no date. “Mandate.” 
Accessed July 21, 2017. https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate.
76
Journal of Regional Security Vol. 14 № 2 2019
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). no date. “Frequently Asked 
Questions.” Accessed July 23, 2017. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
operations/about_us/frequently_askedques tions.html.
Weldesellassie, K. Isaac. 2011. “IGAD as an International Organization, Its 
Institutional Development and Shortcomings.” Journal of African Law 55 (1): 1–29.
Welski, Derek M. 2014. Hybrid Court System in Kosovo: Has EULEX proven to be the 
device to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of Judiciary. Pristina: Group 
for Legal and Political Studies. 
Zupančič, Rok et al. 2016. The Balkans Conclusion’s Report. IECEU project, 
deliverable 5.2. Accessed April 20, 2017. http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_
id=2988.
